After Boeing’s cash cow, the 737 Max crashed for the second time in six months in March 2019, the data from the flight recorders and satellite-based tracking showed a similarity between the crash and Indonesia’s Lion Air crash that happened before it.
The cause of both crashes was linked to a Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System(MCAS), a new anti-stall sensor Boeing installed in the Max’s control system to automatically stabilise the plane without informing the pilot.
As the news developed, it was revealed that Boeing did not inform their clients of the new anti-stall sensor and did not include it in the plane’s manual. As a result, pilots were not aware of its existence and were not trained on how to handle or control it should it malfunction.
It was only after the Lion Air crash that Boeing sent out a warning bulletin to airlines operating the plane worldwide informing them of the sensor and how pilots can cut off the system if it malfunctions. This revelation raised speculations that Boeing placed profit over human safety, consequently resulting in tragedy. However, at the time, these were simply conjectures; it wasn’t clear whether it was an oversight on Boeing’s part or a deliberate disregard for human safety over profit.
Now, with the recent release of over 100 pages of internal communications, it has become clear that initial speculations were true. The world’s largest aerospace company and global leader in commercial aviation deliberately omitted certain vital information in the pilot manual concerning the software upgrade to the control system and manipulated the FAA to not require simulator training for pilots, to cut cost.
As reported by the New York Times, in a 2014 exchange between an employee and Mark Forkner, the chief technical pilot of the 737 Max, the employee who was developing the computer-based training for the plane suggested providing more guidance in the pilot manual for how to handle certain emergencies. Forkner turned down the suggestion, saying it couldn’t be done as it could lead regulators to require more training for pilots. “We need to sell this as a very intuitive basic pilot skill,” Forkner wrote.
Even after both crashes, Boeing maintained that simulator training was unnecessary, promising only to update pilot training for the new software via an additional 10 to 15 minute iPad course. But last Tuesday, just before releasing pages of its internal communications to investigators on Thursday, January 9, Boeing said it had advised regulators that pilots need more than a brief iPad-based course to fly the Max. Simulator training can be costly and would likely delay the return of the long-grounded aircraft. According to a report by Bloomberg, it would cost the company about $5 billion to give pilots simulator training.
Some other messages in the trove of internal communications reveal employees making a mockery of the 737 Max design saying it is “ridiculous” and “designed by clowns”. They also expressed reservations over the plane’s safety. In one of such messages, an employee told a colleague, “Would you put your family on a Max simulator trained aircraft? I wouldn’t.”
Since these documents became public, Boeing has expressed regret over the messages, saying they do not represent the best of the company nor reflect its culture. Having fired its former chief executive, a new CEO, David Calhoun takes over today with the hope of returning the company to the right path to save its dwindling shares and to restore client and public confidence.
Before the crashes, the 737 Max was Boeing’s bestseller; in 2018 the company made a record sale of over $100 billion for the first time in its history of over a hundred years selling over 806 commercial airplanes, over 70 percent of them were 737 MAXes.
